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INTRODUCTION

Knowledge is a very elusive commodity.' But the ability to create new
knowledge and to use it efficiently in the productive process is a funda* Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Sao Paulo; Senior Researcher,
Fundacao Instituto de Pesquisas Economicas, Sao Paulo, Brazil. This Article was written while the author was a Visiting Professor at the School of Advanced International
Studies/The Johns Hopkins University with support from the program CAPES/Fulbright. The author gratefully acknowledges comments by Alice T. Zalik, Alison J.
Sondhaus, John H. Welch, Robert E. Hudec, and Robert M. Sherwood. The views
expressed here are the sole responsibility of the author.
1. For the sake of consistency, this Article will employ the following arbitrary definitions: a) Knowledge is a stock concept. When it flows in or out its point of storage (e.g.,
the mind, a book, software, a computer memory), it becomes information; b) Science is
the "body of verifiable knowledge and an associated conceptual framework that attempts
to structure the observable features of the natural world and to predict the outcome of
observations and experiments yet to be conducted." J. GRANGER, TECHNOLOGY AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 9 (1979); c) Technology is knowledge employed in the pro-
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mental requirement for economic development.2 Knowledge products (or
products of the mind) resemble a pure public good to the extent that
their benefits are usually characterized by incomplete appropriability.
Such a characteristic provides the basic economic rationale for government intervention in the production of knowledge.' Granting intellectual
property rights via legal codes to the producers of new knowledge is a
common response to this problem.
Although most societies recognize the importance of intellectual property protection, there are significant differences in the way in which nations approach this issue. Differences among national intellectual property systems are tantamount to nontariff barriers (NTBs) to trade
insofar as they may affect trade in knowledge-intensive products.4 Yet,
these differences are not cognizable under GATT despite "GATT's proscription of NTBs." 5 In the 1980s, industrialized countries began to
change their trade laws, classifying "defective" intellectual property systems as a type of unfair trade practice. Meanwhile, under the leadership
of the United States, the First World began to press for the extension of
GATT disciplines to trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights
(TRIPs). As a consequence, TRIPs became one of the formal negotiating groups in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations.
This Article explores the attitude of less developed countries (LDCs)
with respect to the debate on TRIPs at the Uruguay Round.6 Part II

duction of goods and services for the satisfaction of human needs. For further details on

these concepts,

see ECONOMIC COUNCIL OF CANADA, REPORT ON INTELLECTUAL AND
1-30 (1971); P. DASGUPTA & P. STONEMAN, ECONOMIC POL-

INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY,

ICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL PERFORMANCE

(1987); G.

YANKEY, INTERNATIONAL PAT-

ENTS AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS TO LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

(1987).

2. See generally Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function,
39 REV. ECON. & STAT. 15, 12-20 (1957); E. DENISON, ACCOUNTING FOR SLOWER
ECONOMIC GROWTH (1979); Mansfield, Intellectual Property Rights, Technological
Change, and Economic Growth, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND CAPITAL
FORMATION IN THE NEXT DECADE (C. Walker & M. Bloomfield eds. 1988).
3. See generally Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resourcesfor Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609 (R. Nelson ed.
1962).
4. The expressions "intellectual property system" or "intellectual property regime"
will be used here to summarize the whole array of intellectual property laws (patents,
copyright and neighboring rights, trademarks, geographic denominations and designs,
chip topography protection, trade secret rights) as well as enforcement practices concerning these laws.
5. Stern, Intellectual Property, in THE URUGUAY ROUND: A HANDBOOK FOR THE
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 202 U. Finger & A. Olechowski eds. 1989)
[hereinafter HANDBOOK].
6. In many instances in this Article, the LDCs will be referred to as if they had a
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addresses the evolution of the debate at the GATT level. Part III
presents the economics of intellectual property rights protection from the
point of view of LDCs. Finally, Part IV summarizes the main conclusions and recommendations of the Article.
II.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE

GATT

By the end of the Tokyo Round (1979), both developed and developing contracting parties of the GATT shared a sense of frustration. Despite important results in the Tokyo Round- particularly in extending
some discipline to the use of NTBs-there was a widespread feeling that
the multilateral trade system was not working well.' For the LDCs, the
shortcomings of the "special and differential treatment approach" (S&D)
coupled with GATT's deficient coverage of their main trade interests
were the basic reasons for frustration. For the industrialized countries,
frustration reflected the concern with free-rider behavior by LDCs and
the recognition of the growing importance of trade issues that were not
dealt with properly in the GATT-such as services, intellectual property
rights, trade-related investment measures, and high-technology trade.
The economic crisis of the early 1980s put additional pressure on the
system because it accelerated the adoption of protectionist measures
throughout the world. Against this background, the United States called
a GATT Ministerial Meeting in 1982 to serve as a launch pad for a
new round of multilateral trade negotiations (MTN).
The agenda suggested by the United States included the so-called new
themes, a more stringent discipline for agricultural export subsidies and
the creation of a safeguards code. To a certain extent, the American proposal tried to pave the way for a GATT reform (that is, the inclusion of
the new themes).8 By putting together the new themes with issues of

joint position with respect to intellectual property rights and the Uruguay Round. Of
course, this is an oversimplification of the issue. Most of the time, what is presented as
the position of the LDCs reflects positions adopted by Brazil and India, which are the
most active Third World countries in these negotiations. At the same time, the positions
of the industrialized countries are presented from the perspective of the "maximalist"
proposals of the United States. These simplifications help to emphasize the main differences in the debate in a "North-South" framework.
7. See Martone & Primo Braga, Brazil and the Uruguay Round, Paper presented at
the Conference on the Multilateral Trade Negotiations and the Developing Countries,
sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation, Washington, D.C., Institute for International
Economics (1988).

8.

For additional details on the antecedents of the Uruguay Round, see Bergsten &

Cline, Conclusion and Policy Implications, in TRADE POLICY IN THE 1980's, 747, 760-

63 (W. Cline ed. 1983); Maciel, 0 Brasil e o GATT, 3 CONTEXTO INTERNACIONAL 81-
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interest to numerous countries (agriculture and safeguards), the American negotiators expected to find enough support for the launching of a
new round. This agenda, however, was not well receiied in Geneva. The
European Community, particularly France, was skeptical about the
prospects of trade liberalization efforts amid world recession. The LDCs
stressed that the main problems with the multilateral trade system, from
their point of view, were related to the'lack of compliance by industrialized countries with GAIT disciplines in traditional trade areas (such as
agriculture, textiles, and clothing). Accordingly, the task of recovering
the GATT's credibility would be best served not by extending its disciplines to new areas, but by addressing the old problems of the system.
These different views clashed in Geneva, and the Ministerial Declaration of November 1982 reflected the lack of consensus in favor of a new
round.' The Declaration included general remarks about the desirability
of a more efficient safeguard system, recognized the "urgent need to find
lasting solutions to the problems of trade in agricultural products," and
recommended "to each contracting party with an interest in services" to
develop national studies in order to form the basis for future debate.1"
LDCs' priorities were also acknowledged with reference to the importance of S&D and pledges of further trade liberalization in textiles and
clothing and in tropical goods. In practical terms, however, effective
measures were postponed at least until the 1984 Session of the Contracting Parties.
Intellectual property rights were also mentioned in the 1982 Ministerial Declaration. Actually, some analysts"1 consider the inclusion of a
section entitled Trade in Counterfeit Goods in the Declaration as a
milestone in the history of dealing with intellectual property rights
within the GATT. This section stated that the Council should be
instructed:
to examine the question of counterfeit goods with a view to determining
the appropriateness of joint action in the GATT framework on the trade
aspects of commercial counterfeiting and, if such joint action is found to be
appropriate, the modalities for such action, having full regard to the com91 (1986); R. Barros, 0 GA7T de Havana a Punta del Este, REVISTA
COM9Rcro EXTERIOR 9 (1987).
9.

BRASILEIRA DE

MinisterialDeclarationof November 1982, GATT Doc. No. 1328, BISD/29S/9

(1983) reprinted in LAW

AND PRACTICE UNDER THE

GATT 11 1.A.1 (K. Simmonds &

B. Hill eds. 1988).

10. Id. at 5, 10, 16.
11.

See, e.g., Greenwald, The Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in the

GATT and the Uruguay Round: The US Viewpoint, reprinted in
UNDER THE GATT, supra note 9, at IV.A.5, 1.

LAW AND PRACTICE
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petence of other international organizations.

2

It is worth mentioning at this point that intellectual property considerations were present in the GATT since its origin. Article IX, for instance, establishes that marks of origin (trade names, geographical indications, etc.) should not be used in such a way as to hamper
international trade. 3 This article also seeks to prevent misleading indications of the "true origin of a product, to the detriment of such distinctive regional or geographical names of products as are protected by legislation."' 4 Article XX(d), in turn, places the adoption or enforcement of
measures necessary to secure "the protection of patents, trade marks and
copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices" among the socalled general exceptions in the GATT.' 5 These measures, as long as
they are non-discriminatory and necessary to assure compliance with
GATT-compatible laws and regulations, are not bound by GATT disciplines. In addition, there are references in articles XII:3(c) and
XVIII:10 to the fact that trade restrictions allowed under balance-ofpayments crises should not be inconsistent with intellectual property
rights laws. x"
It is also true that many instruments negotiated under GATT auspices, using GATT procedures and practices, took into account intellectual property rights-such as the 1958 recommendation on marks of origin, I7 the Customs Valuation Code,18 and the Stafidards Code negotiated
during the Tokyo Round. 9 The 1982 Ministerial Declaration nevertheless constituted a major development in the history of intellectual property rights in the GATT system. It is important to remember that since
1978 the United States had attempted to garner support for an Anti12. LAW AND PRACTICE UNDER THE GATT, supra note 9, at 1.13.
13. The GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. 1700, 5161 U.N.T.S. [hereinafter GATT], art. IX, Oct. 30, 1947, GATT Doc. No. BISD IV
(1969).

14. GATT, Trade in Counterfeit Goods and Other Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (II), 49 GATT Focus NEWSLETTER 2 (1987).
15. GATT, supra note 12, art. XX(d), reprinted in LAW AND PRACTICE UNDER
GATT, supra note 9, at 53.
16. Id. arts. XII(3)(c), XVIII(10), reprinted in LAW AND PRACTICE UNDER THE
GATT, supra note 9, at 31, 43-44.
17. See Trade and Customs Regulations: Marks of Origin, 1959 BASIc INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 117; GATT, supra note 12, art. IX, reprinted in
LAW AND PRACTICE UNDER THE GATT, supra note 9, at I.A-19.
18. GATT, supra note 12, art. VII, reprintedin LAW AND PRACTICE UNDER THE
GATT, supra note 9, at I.A-15.
19. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (Standards Code) (Jan. 1, 1980)
reprintedin LAW AND PRACTICE UNDER THE GATT, supra note 9, at II.C.4-99.
THE
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Counterfeiting Code. 20 This effort, which gradually gained support from
the European Community, Japan, and Canada, did not reach the consensus level needed for incorporation in the results of the Tokyo Round.
With the Ministerial Declaration, however, the debate on intellectual
property rights gained new momentum.2" In 1984, the GATT established a Group of Experts to study trade aspects of commercial counterfeiting.22 Although this Group could not reach a final decision, the growing concern for intellectual property-related issues paved the way for the
inclusion of TRIPs in the Uruguay Round.
The road to the Uruguay Round, however, was not an easy one. The
idea of a new round of MTN was raised again by Japan in 1983. By
1985, the common perception that the multilateral trading system was in
jeopardy fostered the search for compromises to brighten the gap between developed and developing countries. The introduction of the dual
track approach, concerning negotiations on services, is a good example in
this context.2 3 After tense negotiations, the eighth round of MTN was
finally launched in September of 1986.
The fact that TRIPs became a subject for negotiation in the round did
not mean that an international consensus on the issue had been reached.
Actually, it only meant a change in the focus of the debate which became
centered on the issue of the coverage of the negotiations. The Ministerial
Declaration of Punta del Este represents a masterpiece of diplomatic
compromise and, consequently, allows many interpretations. In the case
of TRIPs, for instance, the negotiating objective read as follows:
In order to reduce the distortions and impediments to international trade,
and taking into account the need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectualproperty rights and to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade, the negotiations shall aim to clarify GATT
provisions and elaborate as appropriatenew rules and disciplines.

20. GATT, Trade in Counterfeit Goods and Other Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (III), 50 GATT Focus NEWSLETTER 2 (1987).
21. In a parallel development, GATT's dispute-settlement mechanism began to be
used frequently to analyze trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights. GATT
panels have addressed, for instance, the use by the United States of section 337 in allegations of patent infringement, the United States copyright "Manufacturing Clause," and
the Japanese labelling practices on imported wines and alcoholic beverages. See id. at 2,

8.
22. Greenwald, supra note 11, at 6.
23. For a description of the dual-track procedure presented by Brazil in June 1985,
see Bhagwati, Services, in HANDBOOK, supra note 5; Martone & Primo Braga, supra
note 7.
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Negotiations shall aim to develop a multilateralframework of principles, rules and disciplines dealing with internationaltrade in counterfeit
goods, taking into account work already undertaken in the GATT.
These negotiations shall be without prejudice to other complementary
initiatives that may be taken in the World Intellectual Property Organization and elsewhere to deal with these matters.24
It is quite clear in this Declaration that a major objective of the negotiations should be the drafting of an Anti-Counterfeiting Code (a multilateralframework). In this context, one could say that the American
position had finally been vindicated. Ironically, this objective was now
further down on the American intellectual property rights agenda. By
1986, pushed by the interests of knowledge-intensive industries, the
United States saw as its main objective the development of a set of standards for intellectual property rights protection in order to curb
"piracy." 25 These standards, "presumably . . . modelled after [United
States] legislation,"" and the GATT's dispute-settlement mechanism,
would provide the means for enhancing intellectual property rights protection on a world-wide basis. The adoption of such standards in the
GATT system would mean a radical departure from the original GATT
approach to intellectual property. As described above, the only GATT
provision which requires the protection of intellectual property rights by
contracting parties is article IX(6). One could argue, however, that the
Declaration provides for such a broad negotiating objective to the extent
that "effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights" is
accepted as a necessary condition to reduce the distortions and impediments to international trade.
From the point of view of the LDCs, such an objective was well beyond the legal mandate for negotiations on TRIPs at the Uruguay
Round. The LDCs accepted the existence of a clear mandate to negotiate
trade in counterfeit goods, but these negotiations should be restricted to
the examination of the trade effects of counterfeiting without entering

24. GATT, MinisterialDeclarationof PuntaDel Elte, of September 20, 1986, re-

printed in LAw

AND PRACTICE UNDER THE

GATT, supra note 9, at 111 .A.3, 25 (em-

phasis added).
25. C. Yeutter, An Agenda for the New GATT Round, Address before the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, September 10, 1986, reprinted in LAW AND PRACTICE UNDER
THE GATT supra note 9, at 111.C.1, 6-7; Gadbaw & Gwynn, Intellectual Property
Rights in the New GATT Round, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT? 38 (R. Gadbaw & T. Richards eds. 1988) [hereinafter
GLOBAL CONSENSUS].

26.

Greenwald, supra note 11, at 9.
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the discussion of "what constitutes counterfeiting. ' 27 Another facet of the
LDCs' position was the resistance to any attempt to transform the negotiations into "an exercise to set standards of protection of intellectual
property rights or to attempt to raise the levels of such protection under
existing multilateral agreements through the strengthening of enforcement procedures ... ."28 LDCs also emphasized their strong support for
the existing international agreements administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 2 -that is, the Paris Convention
(patents, utility models, designs and trademarks, trade names, and appellation of origin),3" the Berne Convention (copyrights),3 1 the Madrid and
Lisbon Agreements (repression of false or deceptive indications of source
on goods, and the protection and registration of appellations of origin) 3 2-and by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO)-namely, the Universal Copyright Convention.3 3 By disputing the adequacy of GATT as a forum for a broad debate on intellectual property rights, the LDCs raised jurisdictional arguments against the American agenda.
The other major players from the First World, the European Community, and Japan, adopted a less radical approach in the negotiations
compared to the United States. 4 Both Japan and the European Community supported the goal of better intellectual property rights protection
around the world. Yet, they did not share the United States enthusiasm

27. Brazil-MRE, As Negociacoes da Rodada Uruguai: Os Novos Temas, Paper
presented at the seminar GATT e a Rodada Uruguai, Sao Paulo, Ministerio, das Relacoes Exteriores, Doc. No. FIESP/CIESP, FA DVSP, 18 (1988).
28. Statement of Brazil to the Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, (March 25, 1987) at 1;
Gadbaw & Gwynn, supra note 25, at 41-2 n.6.
29. Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 19,
1967, 21 U.S.T. 1749, T.I.A.S. No. 6932, 828 U.N.T.S. 3.
30. Paris Convention for Protection of Industrial Property of March 20, 1883, 13
U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 4931, as revised at Stockholm July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1508,
T.I.A.S. No. 6903, 828 U.N.T.S. 305.
31. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 1886,
828 U.N.T.S. 221 (implemented by the United States in H.R. Doc. No. 609 100th
Cong., 2nd Sess. (1988)).
32. Madrid, Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks of April
14, 1981, as revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 389, 201 W.I.P.O.
1983; Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and their International Registration of October 31, 1958, as revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967 and
Regulation of October 5, 1976, 264 W.I.P.O. 1976.
33. Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731, T.I.A.S. No. 3324, 216 U.N.T.S. 132.
34. P. Carl, Intellectual Property Rights in the Uruguay Round: The EC Viewpoint,
in LAW AND PRACTICE UNDER THE GATT, supra note 9, at IV A.6, 19.
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concerning the use of GATT to set international standards for intellectual property systems. Among their major concerns was the use of national intellectual property laws as "barriers to legitimate trade," as in
the case of section 337.35 There were also significant differences in terms
of negotiating tactics. The European Community, for instance, suggested
that negotiations should first address the issue of repression of counterfeiting and piracy. Only after sufficient progress in this area has been
achieved should the negotiations focus on "weaknesses in the availability
and scope of basic rights." '
Given these conflicting agendas, the lack of substantive progress in the
negotiations on TRIPs at the Uruguay Round is not surprising.3 7 The
next section summarizes the main arguments for and against intellectual
property rights protection, emphasizing the economic implications of enhanced intellectual property rights for LDCs.
III.

THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
PROTECTION

The debate on intellectual property rights at the GATT level has thus
far been dominated by the following issues: the question of jurisdiction
(the WIPO v. GATT debate), the interpretation of the negotiating mandate of the Punta del Este Declaration, and procedural questions (the
precedence of the anti-counterfeiting code negotiation and the pace of
negotiations on TRIPs vis-a-vis other negotiating groups in the Uruguay
Round)."8 Some believe that the debate has focused on form rather than
substance, and hence has failed to generate results. If one tries, however,

35.

19 U.S.C. § 1337, 1337a, (1982 & Supp. V 1987); See Barshefsky & Zucker,

Amendments to the Antidumping & CountervailingDuty Laws Under the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 13 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 251, 251 n.2
(1988).

36. Greenwald, supra note 11, at 12 (quoting the EC Commission).
37. The Ministerial Meeting at Montreal in December 1988 confirmed the complexity of the negotiations on intellectual property rights at the GATT level. TRIPs were
among the items (the others being Agriculture, Safeguards, Textiles, and Clothing) that

required further consultations, placing on hold all the results achieved in the other areas
of negotiation. See GATT, Trade Negotiations Committee Meeting at MinisterialLevel,
(1988) GATT Doc. No. MTN, TNC/7 (MIN).
38. The issue of the relative pace of the negotiations on TRIPs, not addressed above,
has been another point of contention. The United States pressed for an early commitment
to negotiate a comprehensive GATT agreement that would establish substantive standards for protection on intellectual property rights. Yeutter, supra note 25, at 6. LDCs
opposed the idea that TRIPs should "move forward more rapidly than any other area of
the GATT negotiations." Richards, Brazil, in GLOBAL CONSENSUS, supra note 25, at
184.
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to identify substantive issues that are at the core of the debate, changing
the focus would not help bring the negotiating parties any closer to consensus. There are major conflicts in the way different nations approach
the issue of intellectual property rights protection lurking behind procedural discussions.
At the legal level,39 the conflict reflects a century old debate on the
territoriality of intellectual property rights laws and its implications for
international trade. Another legal dimension of the debate is to what
extent infringement of private property rights can be attributed to the
state, justifying external reprisals. The Uruguay Round can be interpreted as a new attempt to promote universality in the protection of intellectual property rights. Previous attempts, beginning with the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883,40 have always encountered difficulty in imposing strict international law standards in the area of intellectual property rights. The continuing debate is
even more complex because of its ambitious coverage and the widespread
perception that the United States is trying to translate its domestic provisions into international standards.
The debate also carries clear political connotations. After all, a common definition of international leadership is based on the capacity of a
country to maintain a relative primacy in the generation and commercialization of new technologies.4 Some analysts 42 interpret the growing
concern of industrialized nations with intellectual property rights as an
attempt to control the diffusion of new technologies or "as a weapon in
the struggle of 'haves' against 'have nots'. ' '43 Accordingly, the ultimate
goal of the industrialized countries would be to freeze the existing international division of labor by way of the control of technology transfers to
the Third World. Another political dimension of the debate from the
perspective of LDCs has to do with the role of foreign capital in these
economies. The major beneficiaries of better intellectual property rights
protection, at least in the short run, would be transnational corporations.
In most Third World countries, a reform of intellectual property laws

39.

Wilner, An InternationalLegal Frameworkfor the Transfer of Technology, in

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, 53 (J.

Mc-

Intyre & D. Papp eds. 1986); Meessen, Intellectual Property Rights in International
Trade, 21(1) J. WORLD TRADE L., 67 (1987).
40.

Paris Convention, supra note 30.

41. Rostow, Is There Need for Economic Leadership?Japaneseor U.S.?, 75(2) AM.
ECON. REV., 285 (1985).
42. Barbosa, Por Que Somos 'Piratas'?, Revista Brasileira de Com&io Exterior

(1988).
43.

Stern, supra note 5, at 203.
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perceived to favor foreign capital would be highly controversial.
There are also significant philosophical differences along the NorthSouth divide with respect to intellectual property rights. In the First
World, intellectual property protection is usually presented "as a fundamental right comparable to rights to physical property."" The criticism
of countries with "defective" intellectual property systems is often
designed to stress the high moral ground from which these attacks are
made. The thesis that natural law provides a firm basis to the notion of
inherent rights in products of the mind, however, is at best debatable.
One can make an eloquent case for the importance "to conceive of ideas
as property, and of property not solely as material but also as spiritual."4 5 Yet, the history of the evolution of national patent systems suggests that "economic expediency" has usually dominated legal and moral
considerations.4 As a cpnsequence, any attempt to present a country's
intellectual property system as a model of "enlightened" virtues is bound
to face a great deal fo skepticism in the Third World. Moreover, in contrast with developed economies, LDCs tend to assign a higher weight to
"social" interests (often loosely defined) than to private interests. Intellectual property systems always entail a compromise between private and
social interests. Arguments against intellectual property rights protection
for pharmaceutical and food products, for example, are often based on
social considerations, such as the objective of avoiding price increases in
health and nutrition.4 7
At the core of the conflict between industrialized countries and LDCs,
however, are some basic economic issues. A common belief was that lawyers took intellectual property rights protection too seriously while economists took the issue too lightly. Economists' attitudes towards intellectual property rights, however, have been changing significantly over the

44. Gadbaw & Richards, in GLOBAL CONSENSUS, supra note 25, at 2
(Introduction).
45. Novak, Built Wiser Than They Knew, Lecture in Honor of the Two-Hundreth
Anniversary of the U.S. Constitution, delivered at the University of Santa Clara, at 4
(1987).
46. Anderfelt argues that the notion of inherent rights is hardly compatible with
"systems in which examination (as to novelty, inventiveness, etc.) precedes the patent
grant" as occurs in most countries. U. Anderfelt, International Patent-Legislation and
Developing Countries, Doctoral Dissertation, n. 204, Geneve: Martinus Nijhoff-Den
Haag atg 19 (1971).
47. A good example of this position can be found in the words of Indira Gandhi at
the World Health Assembly in May 1982: "The idea of a better-ordered world is one in
which medical discoveries will be free of patents and there will be no profiteering from
life and death." Gadbaw & Kenny, India, in GLOBAL CONSENSUS, supra note 25, at 86.
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last decade. The growing share of knowledge-intensive products in international trade, the economic impact of new copying technologies, the
possibilities of world-wide integration brought by communication networks, and the increase in international technological rivalry have magnified the economic significance of "piracy." At the same time new technologies (computer software, semiconductor chip design, etc.) are
challenging existing patterns of intellectual property rights protection.
Consequently, there is growing interest in the economics of intellectual
property rights. Nevertheless, the analysis of the costs and benefits of
more sound intellectual property systems for LDCs is still in its
infancy.48
The conventional reasons for intellectual property rights protection-to promote investments in research and development (R&D) and
technological innovation, and to encourage the disclosure of new knowledge-are not enough to make an economic case for the adoption of intellectual property laws. First, one can argue that there are other institutional arrangements which could in theory generate the same results of
the concession of legal rights in new knowledge. As Dasgupta and
Stoneman point out, the theory of public goods suggests at least two
other solutions for the problem of efficient production and allocation of
knowledge: (1) the direct production of knowledge by the government
which would "allow free use of it, and finance the expenditure by the
imposition of lump-sum taxes"; or (2) the encouragement of "private
production of knowledge by the imposition of (differential) subsidies for
their production and the levying of lump-sum taxes to finance these subsidies." 4' 9 This is not the place to discuss these alternative institutional
arrangements, particularly because the debate at the GATT level is not
concerned with this type of discussion. My position is that, not to mention practical considerations, historical hindsight and public choice theory (in essence the criticism of the idea that public officials in performing
their tasks would be basically concerned with the well-being of the nation) provide strong support for the superiority of the proprietary
approach,
It is, however, important to recognize that the economic rationale for
intellectual property rights protection goes beyond the issue of underproduction of knowledge in the absence of government intervention. It re-

48. See MacLaughlin, Richards & Kenny, The Economic Significance of Piracy, in
GLOBAL CONSENSUS, supra note 25, at 89; Sherwood, The Benefits Developing Countries Gain from Safeguarding Intellectual Property, Paper prepared for the Intellectual
Property Committee, Washington, D.C. (1988).
49. DASGUPTA & STONEMAN, supra note 1, at 3.
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quires that the benefits associated with increased production of knowledge be greater than the costs due to its underutilization, a possible byproduct of monopolization. The literature tends to support the proposition that a net positive welfare effect results from intellectual property
rights protection.5" This conclusion, nonetheless, becomes disputable
when the focus of analysis changes from a closed economy (or from a
global perspective) to an open economy. Berkowitz and Kotowitz, for
example, point out that a national government "is bound to value the
welfare of its own citizens or residents more heavily than that of foreigners." 51 In this context, they were able to derive results showing that for
an LDC a shorter period of patent protection (vis-A-vis an industrialized
country) may be optimal in terms of national welfare.52 Lyons adopts a.
more provocative position based on these results, stating that "[tihere ap53
pears to be little reason for small countries to adopt a patent system."
The implications of these results for the North-South debate on intellectual property rights, however, have to be qualified. First, the model is
developed for a small country "in which little invention takes place and/
or in which invention markets are competitive."' 54 Some of the newly
industrialized countries (NICs) of the Third World no longer fit this
description. Second, the model assumes away the possibility of retaliation
against defective intellectual property systems. As recent United States
actions against Korea, Taiwan, and Brazil, as well as European Community measures against Indonesia suggest, the possibility of intellectual
property-related trade retaliations has to be taken into account for an
adequate evaluation of an intellectual property-system reform. Finally,
the model does not capture some of the benefits that sound intellectual
55
property systems may generate.

50. Regarding the patent system, see W.
WELFARE:

A

THEORETICAL TREATMENT

NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH AND
OF TECHNOLOGICAL

CHANGE

(1969);

Nordhaus, The Optimal Life of A Patent: A Reply, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 428 (1972);
Scherer, Nordhaus' Theory of Optimal Patent Life: A Geometric Reinterpretation, 62
AM. ECON. REV. 422 (1972); Tandon, Optimal Patents with Compulso7y Licensing, 90
J. POL. ECON. 470 (1982). For an analysis of the effects of increased copyrights protection, see Novos & Waldman, The Effects of Increased CopyrightProtection:An Analytical Approach, 92 J. POL. ECON. 234 (1984).
51. Berkowitz & Kotowitz, PatentPolicy in an Open Economy, 15 CAN. J. ECON. 1,

2 (1982).
52. See id. at 3.
53. Lyons, International Trade and Technology Policy, in DASGUPTA &
STONEMAN, supra note 1, at 199.
54. Berkowitz & Kotowitz, supra note 51, at 3.
55. For example, the inducement of foreign investment. For a discussion regarding
this point, see infra page 268.
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Despite these considerations it is important to recognize that for a
Third World country a reform designed to increase intellectual property
rights protection will tend to generate a welfare loss at its initial stages.
Because LDCs are typically net importers of technology, a usual consequence of a more strict regime of intellectual property laws would be an
increase in royalty payments to foreigners (d$R). A related cost would be
the displacement of firms devoted to "piracy" (d$P).5 6 From a social perspective, the costs of dislocation of "pirates" will only be relevant as long
as foreigners benefit from the process (either by an increase in imports or
by an increase in license fees paid by domestic firms to the foreign owners of intellectual property rights). As MacLaughlin, Richards, and
Kenny point out the "transfer of sales or royalty payments to other nationals would represent merely a transfer of income from one member of
society to another."5 In this context, this income transfer would not generate a social welfare loss.
Other social costs associated with the reform would be the opportunity
cost of additional domestic R&D (OCdR&D) and the eventual loss of
consumer surplus (dCoS) brought by higher prices that could result from
the "monopolization" process. 8 The issue of the opportunity cost of additional R&D has received little attention in the debate since most analysts seem to profess an unlimited admiration for the benefits of investments in R&D. Without disputing the importance of R&D for economic
development, one should also take into account its related costs. In
LDCs, human-capital tends to be the scarcest factor of production. As a
consequence, an increase in domestic R&D will increase the demand for
this scarce resource with potential implications for other productive ac-

56. One might also argue that in addition to the displacement of piratical activities
one should consider the loss in potential capital formation in these areas after the change
in the intellectual property regime. For the sake of simplicity, however, we will assume
that this effect is captured by the coefficient of dSP.
57. MacLaughlin, Richards & Kenny, supra note 48, at 107 n.22.
58. In most LDCs, the danger of monopolization may be secondary given the existence of price controls. In other words, increased intellectual property rights protection
will not necessarily be translated into higher prices, particularly in industries-such as
the pharmaceutical industry-for which price controls are usually rationalized in terms
of social goals. Indeed, price controls can even play a role in explaining the evolution of
intellectual property systems in the Third World. In the case of Brazil, for example,
Danneman suggests that patent protection for pharmaceutical products was revoked in
1969, because national laboratories under the impact of "a rigid system of price controls.
. convinced the government that their difficulties derived from an unfair advantage foreign laboratories enjoyed in the Brazilian market because of their exclusive patent rights
for the production of most drugs." Danneman, Brazil Not a Pirate of Intellectual Property (interview published in INFOBRAZIL, 10(2), 9 (1989)).
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tivities and could even have a negative short term impact in terms of
income distribution. 9 Another source of potential costs, which were not
considered in the model, are the local subsidiaries of transnational corporations. Local R&D by these companies can be translated into future
royalty payments abroad if intellectual property rights "reside with the
parent company, regardless of the location of the research."O0 The model
also does not take into account the costs of establishing an effective, intellectual property system (from the organization of a "cadre" of patent
examiners to the costs of enforcing intellectual property rights). For a
small LDC, these costs can be substantial.
Turning now to the social benefits that an LDC would achieve by
enforcing more strict intellectual property rights, one could list the following impacts: (a) cost savings associated with new technologies developed by additional R&D and by the disclosure of new knowledge
(CSdR&D); (b) cost savings associated with technological transfers that
could only occur under more strict intellectual property rights protection
(CSdTT); and (c) additional investment fostered by the new regime of
protection (dK). Items (a) and (b) can be interpreted as the main channels through which the benefits of technological change are translated
into economic growth. Other potential benefits could accrue in the form
of higher quality products becoming available for consumption61 and
through the contribution of better national intellectual property rights
protection to world technological growth. The magnitude of this contribution is an open question, but it seems reasonable to assume that the
impact of any individual intellectual property reform in the Third World
would be marginal at best.

59. Another way to look at the opportunity cost of additional R&D, which is relevant for both LDCs and industralized countries, is suggested in an unconventional note
entitled The Uruguay Round Comes to the NFL (1988) by J.M. Finger. Finger presents
the following arguments and questions looking at the intellectual property issue from the
United States perspective:
An extensive governmental system of intellectual property protection encourages
industry to always develop new things that the law will protect for them. A less
extensive system encourages industry to do the old things better. Would we be
better off if all the ways that Japanese cars are better than their competition could
be protected by law? ...Are we, a society that chooses to set aside very little of
our income for savings and investment, really advantaged by a legal system that
encourages frequent changeover of what we produce, and frequent changeover of
the equipment we use to produce it?
Finger at 2-3.
60. Berkowitz & Katowitz, supra note 51, at 16.
61. For an interesting analysis of the benefits of trademarks for consumers, see McLaughlin, Richards & Kenny, supra note 48, at 103-04.
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Assuming that these costs and benefits can be expressed in monetary
terms, the analysis of an intellectual property-system reform from the
point of view of an LDC would require the comparison of the following
functions:
(1) C = f(d$R, d$P, OCdR&D, dCoS)
(2) B = g(CSdR&D, CSdTT, dK)
where, C = social costs associated with a higher level of intellectual
property rights protection.
B = social benefits associated with a higher level of intellectual property rights protection.
A proxy for the net welfare impact (NW) of the reform over a period
of time would be estimated in the following way:
(3) nw
where, a
to
T

=
=
=
=

tof T (B -C )e-at dt
social rate of discount.
the moment of introduction of the reform.
the time horizon relevant for the evaluation.

Equation (3) provides the basic framework for the analysis of an intellectual property-system reform in an LDC. In the case of NW > 0, the
reform should be adopted. In the case of NW < 0, the reform (from a
national point of view) should not be implemented. Its simplicity, however, is misleading. The shape and the evolution over time of functions f
and g, as well as the value of its parameters-such as a-provide many
points of contention. Different specifications of f and g, for instance, will
generate conflicting results. Besides, equation (3) does not take into account the possibility of trade retaliations against "defective" intellectual
property systems.
A typical LDC would most likely incur a net loss in the initial moments after the reform. In other words, it seems reasonable to assume
that Cto > Bt. in the Third World for while the costs associated with
the reform would be immediately felt, the benefits would take time to
materialize. A necessary condition for the reform to generate a positive
NW in an LDC (with the above mentioned initial conditions) is:
(4) g' > F
where, g' = dg/dt and f' = df/dt.
A.

The Case Against Intellectual Property Rights Protection

Those who oppose more strict intellectual property rights protection
tend to dispute the benefits summarized by equation (2). The rationale
for this attitude is partially based on the hypotheses that domestic R&D
will not respond significantly to the reform, that the growth impact of
any additional R&D will be marginal, or that capital formation and
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technological transfer are not very sensitive to intellectual property rights
protection. Some alternative formulations of the above hypotheses are:
local incompetence; a very inelastic supply of human capital; the argument that intellectual property rights protection is only one of the relevant variables which explain R&D and that it can be ineffective in the
absence of additional conditions (such as a larger stock of human capital); the belief that modern technology is carried forward by large enterprises (particularly transnational corporations); and doubts about the net
contribution of foreign capital to economic development.
The criticism is also directed to the cost aspects of an intellectual
property-system reform. First, it is argued that the weight of additional
royalties would be disruptive given the foreign-exchange constraint faced
by many LDCs. Second, a high value is assigned to the perceived benefits of having access to technology in the cheapest possible way. According to this approach, by "taxing" imported products of the mind, 2
LDCs would be lowering the costs of important inputs in the productive
process and they would increase consumption possibilities. In other
words, it is assumed that dCoS would have a very high coefficient. The
question of dislocation of "piracy," however, does not receive much at-'
tention from those who oppose more strict intellectual property laws in
the Third World for tactical and legal reasons. For some countries, particularly those with problems of enforcement of intellectual property
laws, it would not be wise to acknowledge the magnitude of the problem.
For many LDCs the problem simply does not exist since from a legal
standpoint their intellectual property systems comply with international
agreements, such as the Paris Convention (which allows each country to
choose its own patent conditions as long as there is no discrimination
against non-nationals).6 3 As Barbosa notes, entrepreneurs in countries
with "defective" intellectual property systems, from a United States perspective, 'could at best be called corsairs with all the legal licenses to
operate. 4
Hence, the economic case against intellectual property rights protection can be presented in three different formats, all of them based on the
above considerations. The first is the radicalformat, which basically denies the possibility of g' > f'. According to this approach, which is often
combined with political considerations, costs would not only continue to
exceed benefits over time, but the wedge between them would tend to

62. Stern notes that "defective" intellectual property systems are equivalent to a
"tax" on the returns of intellectual property. Stern, supra note 5, at 206.
63. Paris Convention, supra note 30, at art. 2.
64. Barbosa, supra note 42, at 1.
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increase. This latter effect would be caused by the growing dependence
of the LDC on foreign technology. There is also the fear that modern
technology, particularly robotics, would allow countries in the technological frontier to reshape their structures of comparative advantage. Advanced countries could even recuperate competitiveness in traditional labor-intensive activities-such as textiles-imposing structural adjustment
costs upon LDCs. In this context, attempts to back the United States
proposal with static comparative advantage arguments do not find much
echo in the Third World.
The second format, the pragmaticformat, accepts the possibility of g'
> f', but maintains that NW would be negative. Several reasons can be
advanced to explain this result: a very high net loss at the initial stages
of the reform; a high social rate of discount; or f' being only marginally
smaller than g'. The third format is the thresholdformat, which argues
that the shapes of f and g change as development (particularly in terms
of human capital accumulation) evolves. In this context, LDCs would be
advised to wait until the development threshold was reached (from then
on g' not only would be larger than f but NW would be positive) in
order to increase their level of intellectual property rights protection.
B.

The Case for Intellectual Property Rights Protection

The economic arguments for intellectual property rights protection in
the Third World are built around the concept of self-interest. Most analyses implicitly assume not only that condition (4) is obeyed but also that
g' >> f', generating NW > 0. Emphasis is usually placed on the high
social rate of return from investments in new technology and the tendency for under-investment in this area when intellectual property rights
are not well-protected.6 5 The effectiveness of local R&D is heralded and
the micro benefits of sound intellectual property regimes is suggested by
case studies at the firm level. Some analysts, such as Sherwood, 6 recognize that these benefits are difficult to quantify, but they tend to stress
that small firms and universities will become much more active in the
process of technological innovation under enhanced intellectual property
rights protection.
An argument which is becoming quite influential is the thesis that
presently "technology drives investment" and to the extent that technology "is reluctant to flow where it is not protected" the lack of an adequate level of protection could stunt technological transfer and foreign

65. See generally Mansfield, supra note 2.
66. Shervood, supra note 48.
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investment.6 7 The relationship between technology and investment can
also be explored at the domestic level based on the proposition that enhanced intellectual property rights protection, particularly trade secret
laws, would be an important stimulus for local capital formation.
Turning to the social costs of a reform, analysts tend to downplay the
importance of the displacement of pirates. This attitude reflects strong
assumptions about labor mobility in the Third World coupled with the
belief that growth in sectors benefited by the reform would rapidly absorb displaced workers. The potential loss of consumer surplus (dCoS) is
also downplayed because these benefits would be achieved at the high
cost of fostering imitation and copying instead of invention and creativity.
Hence, the case for protection is built mainly around the potential
benefits of sound intellectual property regimes for LDCs. The microfoundations of these arguments are quite appealing but a great deal of
research is still needed to support their claims. The research agenda will
have to address issues like the R&D response of small firms and the
reaction of individuals in the Third World to enhanced intellectual property rights protection, the role of transnational corporations, the effectiveness of local R&D (the issue of domestic competence), the importance
of protection for technology transfers, the threshold argument, and the
impact of the injection of new technology in terms of economic growth
for LDCs. A parallel effort will have to be developed in order to estimate the magnitudes of d$R and d$P. There are some analyses on the
economic impact of piracy from an industrialized country perspective. 68
These studies focus on revenue loss estimates for United States industries
and are limited in terms of their coverage of industries and countries.
The same methodology, however, can be adapted to estimate dSP.
In sum, a much higher degree of knowledge on the characteristics of
NW in LDCs will be necessary if economic calculus is expected to play a
more influential role in the negotiations. The benefits of this research
agenda should not, however, be oversold in terms of their impact on
trade negotiations. A look at the political economy of intellectual property reforms illustrates this point.
C.

The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights Protection

In this section I assume that additional research will confirm that condition (4) holds in most LDCs (or at least in the NICs). Such a result,

67.
68.

Sherwood, Investment: Driven by Technology, 1.
See, e.g., U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION,

FOREIGN PROTECTION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE EFFECT ON U.S. INDUSTRY AND TRADE,

PUB. No. 2065 (1988); MacLaughlin, Richards & Kenny, supra note 48.
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however, would not mean the end to resistance to more strict intellectual
property rights protection in the Third World. As previously noted, inequality (4) is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to ensure that
NW > 0. Impatient societies, that is countries with very high social
rates of discount, could still find out that a reform would generate a net
economic loss. Politicians and policy-makers in the Third World tend to
adopt very high ci's in response to the instability of their environments.
Consequently, perceptions about the proper range of values for the rate
of discount can be quite different from the ones that prevail in industrialized countries.
Another possibility, perhaps even more interesting from a political.
economy perspective, would be the situation in which the government
would not be able (or willing) to reform the country's intellectual property system despite recognizing that NW is positive. The rationale for
this attitude is analogous to one that usually hinders trade liberalization
attempts: while the benefits would evolve gradually and would affect the
society as a whole (mainly through higher rates of economic growth), the
costs would be immediate and focused on very specific sectors (those
dedicated to "piracy"). Those who have a vested interest in avoiding the
reform would tend to lobby forcefully against enhanced intellectual property rights protection. The potential beneficiaries, in turn, would tend to
be much less organized and prone to adopt a free-rider attitude in the
policy debate. As a result, the political support for such a reform may
not be sufficiently strong to override the opposition. Hence, it is not
enough to point out that an LDC would need only a small increase in its
rate of economic growth in order to offset the "short term benefits of
piracy."6 9 The allocation and concentration of costs and benefits of the
reform is also a major factor in the process.
Up to this point, all economic evaluations assume a small country context. In other words, the country's choice in terms of intellectual property regime would induce neither antagonism nor cooperation from its
trade partners. As suggested above, this hypothesis has been outpaced (at
least in the case of the NICs) by the reality of industrialized countries'
unilateral actions against "defective" intellectual property systems. The
possibility of retaliation has to be taken into account in terms of its impact on NW and on the relevant political equation. Expected export
revenue losses (ERL) should be included among the variables considered
in the benefit function (g).7 0 The expected value of NW would then be

69.

MacLaughlin, Richards & Kenny, supra note 48, at 107.

70. As in the case of d$R, the social cost of ERL should be estimated using the
shadow-price of foreign currency relevant for the economy.
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estimated as a weighted average of NW with and without retaliation, the
weights being the perceived probabilities of retaliation and its complement. In the case of an LDC with a high ERL, as the probability of
retaliation approaches one, the expected value of NW could change from
a negative to a positive sign. In this context, from the perspective of an
industrialized country, the appeal of aggressive reciprocity with respect
to intellectual property rights protection is high. The political economy
of a reform induced by trade retaliation, however, is quite complex.
As discussed above, the fact that NW becomes positive does not guarantee the reform, especially in a situation where economic calculus is
influenced by external pressure. No government likes to be perceived as
submitting to foreign threats. Once retaliation is implemented, domestic
support for stronger intellectual property rights protection may be negatively affected. Trade retaliations are always blunt weapons. The economic groups affected by this process most likely will not be the ones
that profit from "piracy." The burden of retaliation will tend to fall
upon export-oriented sectors that are typically more receptive to arguments in favor of intellectual property rights protection. This fact may
not influence the overall attitude of export sectors towards change, but
certainly it will not enhance their commitment to the cause of intellectual
property rights protection.
A final comment worth making at this point concerns the role of bureaucracies in the intellectual property systems of the Third World.
These bureaucracies are quite influential in the debate and tend to adopt
a critical view of First World proposals for enhanced intellectual property rights protection. Their attitude is often influenced by ideological
interpretations, such as the concept of technological imperialism." It is
important to recognize, however, that their attitudes also reflect the predominance of a scientific ethos which has at its basis the norm of complete disclosure. This "culture," as Dasgupta poses it,"2 is hostile to the
view of knowledge as a private capitalgood that is the foundation of the
so-called mature intellectual property systems of the industrialized economies. Consequently, the dialogue between technology-oriented interests
and government bureaucracies, an important domestic facet of the intel-

71. Arruda, for example, suggests that by excluding the clause of full disclosure in
the context of patents in new technologies, industralized countries would be able to dominate markets and to control competition. Arruda, 0 Desenvolvimiento Tecnol6gico
Brasiliero Atrave~s de Internacionaizacao de Economica, Paper presented at the seminar
A Nova Politica Industrial, Sao Paulo, FIPE (1988).
72. Dasgupta, The Economic Theory of Technology Policy, in DASGUPTA &
STONEMAN, supra note 1, at 10.
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lectual property rights debate, tends to be a difficult one.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This Article has summarized the economic aspects of the debate on
intellectual property rights and their relevance for the Uruguay Round
negotiations from a Third World perspective. The main points are the
following:
First, the impact of enhanced intellectual property rights protection
upon Third World economies may vary significantly among different
countries. There is no a priori strong evidence that these countries will
necessarily benefit or lose from a reform of their intellectual property
systems.
Second, the political economy of intellectual property rights protection
helps to explain the resistance of LDCs to reforms even when a strong
case based on economic self-interest can be developed.
Third, the uncertainty in terms of economic calculus, as well as legal,
political and philosophical differences along the North-South divide, suggest that radical proposals will not lead the way in the Uruguay Round
negotiations. The importance of trade distortions generated by discrepancies among national intellectual property systems, however, will probably
continue to increase over time. In this context, GATT disciplines for
TRIPs are a worthwhile goal to be pursued in the long run. Gradualism
is probably the best strategy to achieve this goal. The completion of an
Anti-Counterfeiting Code could be a first step in the right direction. The
comity approach followed by WIPO should also be encouraged.
Finally, experience in this area has shown that unilateral actions
designed to force LDCs to reform their intellectual property systems may
easily backfire and, given the present stage of the debate, can lead to the
contamination of other negotiating areas in the Uruguay Round.

